The results of some recent ingenious labor supply research might appear incompatible with the notion that uncompensated wage elasticities for men are small, perhaps negative. This paper argues there is no incompatibility. The methodology in this recent research results in computing wage responses that come closer to measuring intertemporal wage elasticities than to uncompensated wage elasticities. This is demonstrated in this paper by using pseudo-panel data constructed from the March Current Population Surveys from 1967 to 1998 to measure both intertemporal wage elasticities and uncompensated wage elasticities. The latter appear sensitive to the particular specification of the hours equation.
I. Introduction
By the 1980s, an approximate consensus existed among economists that, for primeage men, uncompensated wage elasticities of work hours were small in absolute value, possibly even slightly negative. A series of papers in the 1990s have shown that, at least for some specifications, wages and indicators of labor supply are clearly positively correlated. For instance, Juhn (1992) uses measures of weekly and annual work participation to demonstrate that these measures are positively associated with wage rates and this association helps to account for the decline in the participation of low skill and older men from the late 1960s to the late 1980s.
1 In another study, Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (1991) report relatively large wage elasticities when annual weeks worked are related to hourly wages.
What is the interpretation of these and other results and do they overturn the 1980s consensus? The purpose of this paper is to distinguish conceptually among different work-wage elasticities and to specify equations whose parameters correspond to these wage elasticities. These parameters are then estimated using pseudo-panel data constructed from thirty-two annual March
Demographic Supplements of the Current Population Survey from 1968 to 1999. Estimates of intertemporal wage elasticities in this paper are invariably positive and they are close to those 2 The model sketched below draws heavily on previous research on life cycle labor supply especially MaCurdy (1981) and Browning, Deaton, and Irish (1985) . A recent valuable survey of methodological issues in this work is contained in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999 C a h a reported in previous work. When uncompensated wage elasticities are computed, they are consistent with the 1980s consensus: they are small in absolute value, sometimes positive and sometimes negative. In general, confident assertions about the value of uncompensated wage elasticities seems inappropriate given the sensitivity of estimates to econometric procedure. I conjecture that previous research in the 1990s has typically estimated the intertemporal wage elasticity. More generally, the principal purpose of this paper is to argue that the specification of the control variables in a study of labor supply has important consequences for the interpretation and computation of the effects of wages on work behavior.
II. Conceptual Framework
Modern research takes a life-cycle perspective on work and consumption decisions.
In the theoretical model developed below, an individual's schooling decisions are assumed to have been made independently of the key variables used in the empirical work. This is a stronger assumption than necessary and the models estimated below can accommodate joint schooling investment decisions. However, the exposition is facilitated by putting aside such investment decisions and focusing on work and wages. 
.
where a denotes age, U the age-specific utility function, C consumption, h hours of work, and J the rate of time preference. A budget constraint defines incomes and expenditures at each age where borrowing and lending at a given interest rate, r, allows for intertemporal reallocation of income and expenditure decisions:
Here A 0 denotes initial real wealth and w the real wage. For those who work positive hours, the level of their hours, h, is determined by the first-order condition
where 8 is the marginal utility of initial wealth (that is, the Lagrange multiplier attached to the budget constraint) and B = (1 + J)/(1 + r).
To arrive at a specification that may be brought to the data, suppose the utility function of all individuals belonging to cohort k at age a with schooling s may be expressed as (a) . Equation (2) is sometimes called the Frisch labor supply function. The parameter 2 is the intertemporal substitution elasticity.
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It shows how an individual adjusts his work hours in response to changes in wages as he ages holding constant his marginal utility of initial wealth, 8, which is contained in B.
3 This holds in a model such as this where information about future wages and prices is complete. (a-1) . Equation (4) has different stochastic properties from equation (3) and it is sometimes proposed as a more suitable form to fit the Frisch function when future values of variables are uncertain. However, errors of measurement usually constitute a larger component of the observed variation of a variable when first differences of variables are formed and this tempers the value of first difference equations such as equation (4). Nevertheless, both equations (3) and (4) will be estimated below in Section IV to derive estimates of 2.
The Uncompensated Wage Elasticity 
where the coefficient attached to the logarithm of current wages, ln [w k,s (a) ], is the sum of 2, the intertemporal substitution elasticity, and 0 a , the effect on work hours at age a for cohort k of parametric differences in the wage profile. With 2 positive and 0 a negative, the coefficient on current wages in equation (6) is ambiguous in sign.
The economist who seeks to estimate equation (6) requires knowledge of wages throughout an individual's life and of initial assets. This presents very demanding data requirements.
To circumvent this problem, suppose for a given cohort and schooling group, as individuals age, the logarithm of wages follows a quadratic path. The parameters, D i , governing this process for wages over the life cycle are assumed to vary by schooling and cohort:
4 The > parameters could be made a function of schooling and cohort just as the wage parameters are in equation (7). As far as equation (9) below is concerned, the interpretation of some of the subsequent coefficients is affected, but the functional form of the equation in terms of included variables is unaffected.
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Here the : ij coefficients involve the F, D and > coefficients on age in equations (7) and (8). The coefficient on current nonwage income is $ = 0 A (r 0 ) -1 . In equation (9), * = 2 + 0 a which may be 
where
With current nonwage income on the right-hand side, equation (9) has the appearance of a static labor supply function and, indeed, * may be interpreted as the conventional within-period uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply. In equation (9), note that age appears as a quadratic term interacted with cohort and schooling. According to the life cycle model, current nonwage income is endogenous because the disturbance term in equation (9)
Equations (3) and (9) are those fitted to the pseudo-panel data below. Their firstdifferenced versions -equations (4) and (10), respectively -will also be estimated. It needs to be emphasized that the coefficients attached to current wages in equations (3) and (9) 6 Another example occurred in 1992 when the form of the schooling attainment questions changed. Before 1992, respondents were asked to provide their highest grade attended and whether they had completed that grade. These questions allowed the construction of highest grade completed. From 1992, the CPS has asked about individuals' highest degree received. In 1994 the sequence and precise wording of the questions on work hours in the CPS changed. For a description and analysis of these changes, see Rones, Ilg, and Gardner (1997) . 7 The samples of adult men on which the analysis below is based average about 34,000 annual population observations. The primary alternative source of information on hours are the establishment surveys. These will count employees twice if they have two jobs, whereas the CPS provides information on the total hours worked of a surveyed individual on all jobs in the surveyed week. Prior to 1975, the weeks worked by individuals are placed by the CPS within intervals and, as others have done, I have used the information on patterns of weeks worked after 1975 to infer something about work prior to 1975. See the data appendix.
8 I adopt the convention that calendar year t in this paper refers to information collected by the Current Population Survey in March of t+1.
9 Previous research making use of psuedo-panels includes Browning, Deaton, and Irish (1985) , Angrist (1991) , Moffit (1993) , and Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir (1998) .
of recording information was replaced by computer-assisted interviews.
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The principal advantages of the CPS are that it is a much larger survey than major alternative surveys 7 and is designed to be nationally representative. The data analyzed in this paper are drawn from the March CPS over 32 years from 1968 to 1999. 8 The dependent variable used below is annual hours of work (which is defined as the product of hours worked in the previous week and weeks worked in the previous year). All figures in this paper on average annual hours are conditional on being employed.
Individuals from each March CPS are first sorted by race (White and Black) and then they are placed in fourteen birth cohorts, each cohort being defined as a five year interval. The conceptual framework sketched in the previous section describes a life cycle so it is natural to organize the data in the form of birth cohorts. 9 Within these pseudo-panels, individuals are placed in cells by years of age (between ages 25 and 64 years) and by years of schooling. This upper age 10 Equations (9) and (10) specify a linearized schooling variable. This is constructed by assigning the value of 11 years to those in the schooling category "less than 12 years of schooling", of 12 years to those in schooling category "12 years of schooling", of 14 years to those in schooling category "13-15 years of schooling", of 16 years to those in schooling category "16 years of schooling", and of 17 years to those in schooling category "more than 16 years of schooling". The linearized schooling and cohort variables derive from the equation immediately following equation (7). If dichotomous schooling variables and dichotomous cohort variables were formed, equation (9) would be estimated with a very large number of age-schooling and age-cohort interactions. The specification used here economizes on these interactions.
11 See Heckman and Robb (1985) . References to the older literature on this topic are supplied in Angrist (1991) .
truncation means that, even though employment-population ratios fall off considerably before age 64, this paper is not really concerned with retirement. If retirement were a principal concern of this research, questions about the eligibility of people for public and private pensions and the terms of receipt of those pensions would be major concerns. The lower age truncation, 25 years of age, is designed to attenuate problems arising when individuals combine schooling with market work.
There are five schooling groups: those with less than 12 years (approximately, high school dropouts), those with 12 years (high school graduates), those with 13-15 years, those with 16 years, and those with more than 16 years of schooling.
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There are potential benefits to creating pseudo-panels of this sort. Whenever the underlying observations contain errors in measurement, these errors may be reduced by grouping data. Indeed, under certain circumstances, applying least-squares to the grouped data mean values is equivalent to an instrumental variable procedure. 11 Table 1 13 See the appendix for information regarding the construction of these data. Average hourly earnings is formed for each individual by dividing total annual earnings by annual hours worked. The conversion to real average hourly earnings uses the price index (1992 = 1) for personal consumption expenditures as a deflator.
14 If we were to graph the annual hours worked of the well-schooled compared with the poorlyschooled, larger cohort differences would be evident. The annual hours series in Figure 1 conceals these skill differences. Also, slightly stronger cohort differences are evident if we were to plot employment-population ratios. The data graphed in Figures 1 and 2 are five year employment weighted moving averages of the underlying annual observations from age 20 to age 64 years. The moving average smooths the data and reduces the impact of business cycle effects. Average annual work hours by cohort and age are shown for five cohorts in Figure   1 . There is a familiar inverted U-shape, but there is little consistent pattern to the differences across cohorts. 14 The corresponding graph for average real hourly earnings by cohort are shown in Figure   2 . Of course, beneath these cohort data are some well-known changes in the structure of earnings.
For instance, recent cohorts are better educated than older cohorts and part of the rising age-earnings pattern for younger cohorts reflects the rising premium to additional schooling over the past twenty years. At older ages, according to Figure 2 , more recent cohorts are earning more than older cohorts. 15 The standard errors are estimated by White's procedure for accommodating arbitrary heteroskedasticity. 16 Thus, in their study of the records and of interviews of employees at a large manufacturing firm, Rodgers, Brown, and Duncan (1993, p. 1217) found, "Only about 25% of the variation in a measure obtained by dividing interview reports of annual earnings by annual work hours was valid......The implied bias in using any of the hourly earnings measures as right-hand side variables is very large". For an argument that average hourly earnings in the CPS are also characterized by serious measurement error (especially for those who work few weeks in a year), see Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (1991) . Also see Welch (1997) and Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) for evidence on the "division bias" problem.
At younger ages the reverse tends to be the case as is implied by previous research showing that ageearnings profiles have become steeper. The "tail" on the earnings series for cohorts 7, 9, and 11 in Figure 2 indicates the impact of the 1990s economic expansion on real earnings.
IV. Measuring Labor Supply Parameters Instrumental Variables
This section presents estimates of the labor supply equations developed in Section II above using the pseudo-panel data described in Section III. IV-B. In the male labor supply equations estimated in this paper, the wage variable is measured at the level of the cohort-age-schooling cell so different candidates as instrumental variables are other variables on income measured at this level. Reasoning along these lines, a second set of instrumental variables consists of the logarithm of the real hourly earnings of unmarried women and the real nonwage income of unmarried women, both variables measured for each cohortage-schooling cell in the same way as the corresponding variables constructed for men. The economic argument here is that some of the forces accounting for the variations in male hourly earnings operate in the same fashion on the wages of unmarried women. In these pseudo-panel data, 18 These observations on unmarried women are constructed from the very same CPS data that forms the basis for our male data. Observations on White unmarried women were used for the instruments for ln(w) for the White men and the observations on Black unmarried women were used for instruments for ln(w) for the Black men.
19 When )ln(h) is the dependent variable, )ln(w) is predicted using both current values and one year lagged values of the relevant instrumental variables.
the regression of ln(w) on this set of instruments yields an R 2 of 0.700 for White men and of 0.375
for Black men.
18
In each instance, the set of instruments removes a larger fraction of the variance of ln(w) for White men than that for Black men and, indeed, the test statistics reported below suggest more concern over the adequacy of the instruments in the Black men's work equations than in those for White men.
The Intertemporal Substitution Elasticity Table 2 reports instrumental variable estimates of 2, the intertemporal substitution elasticity. Those estimated using equation (3) suggests negligible finite-sample bias when equation (3) is fitted.
The effectiveness of the instruments in the first difference specification is less 20 In estimating equation (3), the IV-A estimates of F, the coefficient on age, are -0.0042 (0.0003) for White men and 0.0001 (0.0003) for Black men and the IV-B estimates of F are -0.0027 (0.0004) for White men and 0.0007 (0.0009) for Black men. Given that F . 2 (J -r), negative estimates of F for White men imply that the real rate of interest (r) exceeds the rate of time preference (J). For example, the estimate of F of -0.0042 and 2 of 0.28 imply that the real rate of interest exceeds the rate of time preference by about 1.5 percent. For Black men, the gap between the time preference and the rate of interest is negligible.
21 Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) report estimates of the intertemporal substitution elasticity for men of between 0.14 and 0.20. Using a similar approach for women, in an earlier paper I estimated the intertemporal labor supply elasticity of women to be approximately 0.19 (Pencavel (1998) The Uncompensated Wage Elasticity
Now consider using these psuedo-panel data to estimate *, the coefficient on the logarithm of wages in equation (9) and on the change in the logarithm of wages in equation (10).
To estimate these equations, y is measured as the income received by these men as rent, dividends, and interest at age a. Both ln(w) and y are treated as endogenous as are their first-difference equivalents, )ln(w) and )y. When the trade variables are used as instrumental variables, the results are reported under "IV-A". When the wage and nonwage income of unmarried women are used as instruments, the results are reported under "IV-B". Panel A of Table 3 relates to equation (9) and Panel B relates to equation (10). As in the case of equations (3) and (4), for the estimates reported 22 The corresponding estimates of $, the coefficient on nonage income, are sometimes positive and sometimes negative, but always of little economic significance. For instance, in estimating equation (9) with IV-B, the estimate of $ is -0.0219 (0.0135) for White men and -0.0135 (0.0461) for Black men. Given that nonwage income is measured in thousands of dollars, a value of $ of -0.02 implies that $10,000 higher annual nonwage income (a large increase) is associated with about 45 fewer hours worked per year (evaluated at mean hours). Again, much of the previous research on measuring the effect of contemporary nonwage income on work hours yields small effects that (when not prohibited by the estimating procedure) are as often positive as negative. See, for example, Juhn and Murphy (1997) . The F statistics for the test of the joint statistical significance of the excluded instruments are much lower for nonwage income than those for wages. For example, for the IV-A estimates of equation (9), they are 12.9 for White men and 3.3 for Black men.
in Table 3 , the power of the instrumental variables in the first-difference specification tends to be meagre. However, the general inferences regarding * from the first-difference specification tend to be similar to those from fitting equation (9).
In Panel A of Table 3 , the estimates of * are negative for both White men and Black men when one set of instrumental variables is used and are positive when another set of instrumental variables are used. For Black men, the estimates of *, though of different sign, are not sufficiently precisely estimated that we may confidently assert they are statistically different from one another.
In Panel B, the first-difference version, none of the estimates of * is significantly different from zero judged by the usual criteria. The point estimates suggest a range of values of the uncompensated wage elasticity of from -0.18 to 0.25 for White men and of -0.17 to 0.12 for Black men. The central tendency of these estimates is of an uncompensated wage elasticity a little less than zero, a value compatible with the dominant research on this issue.
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Interpretation
The uniformly positive association between wages and work hours estimated in equations (3) and (4) and the ambiguously-signed association between wages and work hours in equations (9) and (10) are fully compatible with the model sketched in Section II. This is because 23 This is because the partial R 2 statistics tend to be much higher for this set of instruments.
24 If the model were specified and estimated at the level of the individual, fixed individual effects would be needed to fit equation(3) and this would require longitudinal data on individuals. Also, longitudinal data would be required to fit equations (4) and (10) to individual data. However, nonpanel data can be used to fit equation (9) to individual data. Taking a 5 percent random sample of the entire data set from 1967 to 1998 (a total of 35,289 White men) and fitting equation (9) (9) is fitted to a random sample of 14,865 individual Black men, * is estimated as -0.060 with an estimated standard error of 0.087, again an IV estimate. There is nothing about these estimates of * that is inconsistent with those reported in Table 3 . However, the power of these instruments at the level of individual data is feeble: the partial R 2 between the instrumental variables and ln(w) is 0.001 for White men and 0.005 for Black men. Some work with these pseudo-panel data was also directed to allowing * to vary with personal characteristics. Thus, if 0 a varies with age, then equation (9) should permit * to change at different ages. When this was permitted, the resulting estimates of * suggested very little variation with age.
each pair of equations defines a different hours-wage behavioral relationship. Concentrating on the results when trade variables serve as the instruments, 23 the fact that, in the levels form of the equations, the partial regression coefficient on ln(w) changes from +0.28 to -0.14 for White men and from +0.10 to -0.12 for Black men emphasizes the sensitivity of the estimated parameters to control variables. Although there may be a temptation to be casual about the variables used as controls in these work equations, the estimates in Tables 2 and 3 provide clear warning about the consequences of this. A scholar with a strong prior belief that hours-wage relationships are positive will be inclined to fit equations that resemble equation (3). On the other hand, a scholar with a strong prior belief that hours-wage relationships are zero or negative will be inclined to fit equations resembling equation (9). Section II of this paper has argued that neither scholar is wrong, but each is measuring a different hours-wage structural relationship, one that is positive (if the theoretical model is correct) and the other that may be positive or negative.
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Given that equation (9) is not quite nested in equation (3), it is not straightforward 25 I concentrate on the equations specified in levels (i.e., equations (3) and (9)) because the test statistics in Table 2 casts doubts on the effectiveness of the instrumental variables in the first differenced versions.
to identify the variables whose inclusion or exclusion most affects the estimated wage coefficients.
However, some mixture of equations (3) and (9) are suggestive about the specification that most affects the estimated wage coefficients. 25 This is illustrated by the estimated coefficients on ln(w) reported in Table 4 . There are three panels to this table, each one starts with the hours specification given by equation (3) and ends with the hours specification in equation (9). The route taken from equation (3) to equation (9) interactions between age and cohort (a.K and a 2 .K) and age and schooling (a.S and a 2 .S) and, through this route, we arrive at the specification given by equation (9) where the wage coefficient is given by *. With this last step, for both White and Black men, the estimated wage coefficients become more negative. In this sequence, therefore, it seems as if the quadratic in age and the interactions between age and cohort and age and schooling are the crucial modifications to account for the reduction in the wage coefficient from 0.28 in equation (3) to -0.14 in equation (9) for White men and from 0.10 in equation (3) to -0.12 for Black men.
In the second and third panels of Table 4 , different sequences are taken to move from equation (3) to equation (9). In Sequences B and C, the explanation for the change in the value of the wage coefficient from the specification in equation (3) to the specification in equation (9) cannot be reduced to one single variable. Therefore, if the results from this analysis may be generalized, it suggests that the particular specification of age, schooling, and cohort effects in hours of work equations has a decisive effect on the sign and size of empirical hours-wage relationships.
Are these results inconsistent with the labor supply research of others in the last decade? This is not the occasion for a comprehensive review. However, some selective comparisons may be made. For instance, the research of Juhn (1992) and Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (1991) shows, quite convincingly, that the annual weeks worked by men are positively correlated with wages and, indeed, that the movements in wages over time for different groups are in the same direction as the movements in work behavior over time for these same groups.
26 Their research appears to relate weeks worked to wages without holding constant any other variables (except, in 27 On the other hand, their procedures allow for the labor supply function to be nonlinear in wages (something considered below in this paper) and to change over time. This brief description of their work concentrates on only one aspect of their papers.
28 Juhn and Murphy (1997) do not apply this same reasoning to their study of the labor supply of married men where the husband's education is included as a control variable. However, even though these men are aged between 18 and 53 years, they exclude age as a control variable because "we restrict our sample to prime-age males". (See the note to their Table 4 .) Neither equation (3) nor equation (9) in this paper suggests the omission of age from a labor supply equation.
some specifications, for race). 27 If this specification is applied to the data in this paper, the estimates of the coefficient on ln(w) are shown in the first line of Table 5 . They are uniformly positive for both White men and Black men and for both sets of instruments. Their results for annual weeks worked and mine for annual hours are compatible. The estimates in this first line of Table 5 are close to the estimates of the intertemporal wage elasticity reported in Table 2 . I infer that the specification employed by Juhn (1992) and Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (1991) maps out estimates that are close to intertemporal wage elasticities.
The issue is what controls (if any) ought to be included in labor supply equations.
The answer depends on what behavioral parameter the researcher seeks to measure. The model in Section II has proposed that different controls imply different types of wage elasticities. The procedure followed by Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (1991) does "....not follow the traditional practice of controlling for education, marital status, or other observables that raise wages and are also associated with greater labor supply" because "...we assume that more educated persons work more because they earn higher wages" (p. 114). 28 There is no need simply to "assume" this. Consider the estimates in Table 5 it appears as if the more schooled work more hours even holding wages constant: hence, more schooled men work more hours in part because of their higher wages, but this is not their only reason for longer work hours. 29 From the various specifications reported in Table 5 , it is evident that the presence of schooling seems to affect the estimates of the wage coefficients most. Indeed, as more control variables are introduced, so the estimated wage coefficients become more imprecisely measured, more sensitive to the particular configuration of control variables used, and more sensitive to the set of instrumental variables applied.
Variable Wage Elasticities
One result from this 1990s research that has not yet been touched upon in this paper concerns the notion that labor supply elasticities are greater for low skill male workers than for high skill workers. 30 To examine this possibility, consider amending equation (3) by permitting the intertemporal labor supply elasticity to be a linear function of ln(w) as follows: 2 = 2 0 + 2 1 .ln(w).
This implies an hours equation with a term involving the square of ln(w). Similarly, consider amending equation (9) by permitting the uncompensated wage elasticity to be a linear function of ln(w) as follows: * = * 0 + * 1 .ln(w). This implies another hours equation involving the square of ln(w). If 2 1 and * 1 are negative, hours-wage elasticities are higher for low-wage workers.
Using the trade variables as instruments, the estimates of 2 0 and 2 1 and of * 0 and * 1 31 The intertemporal labor supply elasticity is defined as 2 0 + 2.2 1 .ln(w) and the uncompensated wage elasticity is defined as * 0 + 2.* 1 .ln(w).
are given in the top panel of Table 6 . The implications of these parameter estimates for labor supply elasticities are given in the bottom panel of Table 6 where work elasticities are computed at the 1990s mean value of the logarithm of the real hourly earnings for all workers and at the 1990s mean values of the logarithm of the real hourly earnings for workers in each of five schooling groups.
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For White men, the intertemporal labor elasticities clearly fall with wages for White men and this is consistent with Juhn, Murphy, and Topel's finding that work responses are lower for high skill men. This result appears not to extend to Black men. The uncompensated wage elasticities also fall with wages for both White men and Black men: for example, for White high school dropouts, the uncompensated wage elasticity is -0.03 and is insignificantly different from zero; for White men with more than 16 years of schooling, the uncompensated wage elasticity falls to -0.20. Low-wage men tend to have larger work-wage elasticities than high-wage men.
V. Conclusions
A large amount of research has been undertaken since the 1960s to measure the wage elasticities of labor supply. Assessments of this research in the 1980s concluded that, for prime-age men, uncompensated wage-elasticities were small, possibly even negative. These conclusions might appear, at face value, to be inconsistent with some of the labor supply research in the 1990s which has shown -convincingly, in my view -that some dimensions of labor supply are unambiguously positively correlated with wages. At times, the magnitude of this association appears quite large.
This paper has argued that there is no inconsistency between the consensus reached in the 1980s and the more recent empirical research.
The labor supply elasticities measured in the 1990s research approximate 32 If workers respond to after-tax wage rates, then equation (3) above omits the term 2.ln(1 -t) and equation (9) omits the term *.ln(1 -t) where t is the marginal tax rate. If marginal tax rates are higher (and 1 -t lower) for people with higher wages, the omission of the variable ln(1 -t) will tend to result in downward biased wage elasticities. the data, but they may depend on simple, additive, specifications of the hours-wage relationships and it is not obvious that such simple, additive, specifications are suggested by economic theory.
It needs emphasizing that the results in this paper have been reached without addressing a number of important issues confronting labor supply research. Consequently, the results must be deemed tentative. For instance, this paper has been silent on issues relating to sample selectivity, that is, the fact that workers consist of a non-random, self-selected, sample of the entire population. Another issue concerns income taxes which have been entirely ignored in the empirical work in this paper. The neglect of taxes does not stem from a belief that individuals are oblivious to them in making their work decisions. The problem is one of measurement: it seems heroic to believe that researchers can measure with any accuracy the marginal income taxes faced by workers.
In this circumstance, making bad guesses may well be worse than making no guesses at all.
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One disconcerting aspect of the estimates in this paper has been the poorly estimated income effects. Not always but often, current measures of nonwage income are positively correlated, 33 Juhn and Murphy (1997) report coefficients on nonwage income in their male labor supply equations that are sometimes positive, sometimes negative, and never of much economic significance.
34 If uncompensated-wage elasticities for men are not far from zero, how would this figure in an explanation for the fact that the wages and hours of well-educated men have tended to rise and those of poorly-educated men have tended to fall? Assume the relative demand for well-educated male labor has risen. Then the labor supply curve of poorly-educated men must have shifted to the left (transfer income and income from illegal activities?) and the labor supply curve of well-educated men must have shifted to the right (cross-wage effects from the rising wage of married women?).
not negatively, correlated with work hours. This result is not unusual. 33 The positive association probably results from a correlation between unmeasured work preferences and asset accumulation:
those people less averse to work convert higher labor earnings in early years into larger flows of nonwage income in later years. Our instrumental variables obviously fail to break this correlation between tastes and wealth.
Moreover, the measure of nonwage income used in this paper -the sum of rent, interest, and dividends -fails to recognize any opportunities to receive income transfers such as supplemental security income, disability benefits, and public assistance income. Because these income transfers are all income-conditioned, what would be needed is not the actual receipt of these types of income support, but the opportunity to receive them, something difficult to measure. The same sort of problem exists in measuring any opportunities for illegal activities. In addition, this paper has been silent about the implications for men's work hours of the growth of the ratio of women's to men's wages during much of the period under study. All of these factors -other income opportunities and male-female relative wages -may have led to shifts in male labor supply curves over the past 35 years, but they have been neglected in this paper. 34 Addressing these issues provides a large agenda for subsequent research.
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Data Appendix For the data analysis in this paper, the adult population is defined as those men aged between 25 and 64 years for whom schooling was not the major activity. (For the 1968 to 1993 CPSs, this means people for whom mjact=5 are omitted. After 1993, those for whom prptrea = 11 or 20 or peobsrsn = 11 or prnlfsch = 1 are omitted.) The employed are those people whose major activity in the previous week was at work or with a job but not at work. (For the 1994-98 CPSs, the monthly labor force recode is coded "employed-at-work" or "employed-absent".)
The employed are defined as those whose values for usual weekly work hours, weeks worked last year, and earnings last year are all positive. In determining hourly earnings, the selfemployed (current and last year) are omitted. Workers whose calculated values of average hourly earnings were very low (less than $1 per hour) or very high (defined below) were excluded from the population and from those employed. Average hourly earnings is defined as total earnings last year divided by the product of weeks worked last year and hours worked in the week prior to the survey. For a few observations, earnings last year suggested a full or almost a full year's work and yet very low values were reported of usual weekly hours. This occurred very infrequently but when it did it was most common for people nearing retirement years who were reducing their market work. Therefore, among those individuals whose earnings were not top-coded, individuals whose average hourly earnings were above $100 in 1976 dollars were excluded (both from the population and from the employed). This ceiling on calculated average hourly earnings was $65 in 1968, $68 in 1969, $70 in 1970, $74 in 1971, $74 in 1972, $80 in 1973, $84 in 1974, $92 in 1975, $100 in 1976, $105 in 1977, $112 in 1978, $120 in 1979, $130 in 1980, $143 in 1981, $156 in 1982, $164 in 1983, $171 in 1984, $178 in 1985, $184 in 1986, $190 in 1987, $198 in 1988, $206 in 1989, $216 in 1990, $228 in 1991, $238 in 1992, $246 in 1993, $253 in 1994, $259 in 1995, $266 in 1996, $272 in 1997, and $277 in 1998 . Typically, this has the effect of removing a very few observations on people in their late fifties or early sixties whose hours worked last week are very low and yet whose earnings last year are relatively high.
The schooling codes in the CPS in the years from 1992 onwards are different from those in earlier years. Before 1992, a person's completed years of schooling was mapped straightforwardly into the categories we created. For the years 1992-98, people whose schooling was coded as 31-37 were classified as having less than 12 years of schooling, people whose schooling was coded as 38-9 were classified as having 12 years of schooling, people whose schooling was coded as 40-2 were classified as having 13-15 years of schooling, people whose schooling was coded as 43 were classified as having 16 years of schooling, and people whose schooling was coded as 44-6 were classified as having more than 16 years of schooling.
Prior to 1976, the annual weeks worked variable falls into seven categories. To infer weeks worked for these years, the patterns in the 1976 Survey were applied to those in the 1968-75 Surveys. For each race-cohort-age-schooling cell in 1976, the average weeks worked in 1976 in a given weeks worked category was used as the value for an individual's weeks worked before 1976. equation (3) ---add nonwage income ---replace fixed cohort and schooling effects with linearized cohort and schooling variables ---add age squared ---add interactions between (i) age and schooling and (ii) age and cohort ---equation 
